5 Critic

Incivilities reduction policing, zero tolerance, and the retreat from coproduction: weak foundations and strong pressures

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A 2002 New Yorker cartoon depicts two grizzled prisoners whiling away the day on their bunks. The one on the bottom bunk, presumably in reply to a question from the inmate in the top bunk, explains, “There might have been some carelessness on my part, but it was mostly just good police work.” The inmate on the top bunk seems startled by the admission.

The question to consider here is whether broken windows or incivilities reduction policing is good police work. Broken windows policing is conceptually grounded on the incivilities thesis. The incivilities thesis, although it comes in several different guises, suggests that: physical deterioration and disorderly social conduct each contribute independently to fear, neighborhood decline, and crime; by implication, incivility reducing initiatives will contribute to neighborhood stability and safety, and lower fear. To the extent that this logic model is inaccurate, inadequate, or potentially misleading, incivilities reduction as a set of policing strategies may fail to deliver. This chapter will summarize the conceptual limitations of that thesis, and the empirical limitations of the supporting work. It will then broaden the discussion context in two ways: first, to provide an alternate historical outline of where broken windows policing came from and, second, to outline the elements of a police–citizen coproduced process of public safety. Given that context, it sketches the specific challenges facing successful coproduction over time in an urban residential context. Some current practices justified on the basis of the incivilities thesis, such as zero tolerance policing, are probably exacerbating the very problems earlier versions of these policing strategies sought to alleviate.

Incivilities thesis

Evolution

As the data from the first National Crime Victimization Surveys appeared in the early 1970s, researchers started realizing many more residents were
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fearful than were victimized (Garofalo and Laub 1978). “Fear of crime” was more than “fear” of “crime.” In addition to being worried about crime per se, people also were more frequently worried about untidy or disintegrating physical conditions they saw around them, as well as rowdy, decadent, or just misbehaving adults or teens (Wilson 1975). This version of the thesis is psychological and cross-sectional.

The best-known elaboration was contributed by Wilson and Kelling. They suggested, based in part on then-recent foot patrol evaluations in places like Newark, that unrepaired physical damage suggested an increasing and increasingly threatening level of “disorder” to local residents (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Over time, they proposed, residents and other street regulars who watched over the locale would retreat inside from their monitoring posts, leaving the street vulnerable to increasing domination by unruly teens and, later, invading serious offenders drawn in by decreasing guardianship. Wilson and Kelling made the thesis social psychological or group based, and suggested how consequences unfolded over time.

Skogan further ecologized the idea, suggesting that deteriorated physical conditions, and an unruly social climate, could contribute independently to community decline, in three different ways: crime rates should increase faster there, residents would outmigrate faster, leading to structural decline, and residents’ fear or concern should go up faster (Skogan 1990).

Empirical evidence

This section briefly highlights what we know about the empirical support for the thesis (for more details, see Taylor 2001: 179–239).

The cross-sectional version of the incivilities thesis receives strong support at the individual level, especially if the incivilities indicators used are survey based. Those who see more problems in their locale are also more fearful, see local crime rates as higher, and are less sanguine about their neighborhood’s future. These connections persist after controlling for demographics.

The cross-sectional version at the ecological level receives bivariate support. Incivilities connect with crime and with fear. Questions arise, however, when we attempt to partial out basic neighborhood social structure from incivilities per se because the two connect so strongly, especially if assessment-based indicators of incivilities are used (Taylor, Shumaker, and Gottfredson 1985; Taylor 1999). Some earlier cross-sectional, neighborhood-level analyses thought to support the connection
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(Skogan 1990) have been extensively criticized for analytic mis-steps (Harcourt 2001: 76).

Two neighborhood-level studies examined the cross-sectional connections of incivilities and crime using data from the 1990s. In Chicago, results showed the effects of social disorders, captured through assessments, on robbery but not on homicide (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999). Re-analyses of data from five cities found connections between perceived social incivilities and robbery and assault rates, but the strength of the connection was much weakened after controlling for basic neighborhood structure – race, stability, and socioeconomic status (Taylor 1999). In addition, the strength of the connection varied by the crime in question and by city. Both these studies support the idea that incivilities and crime “share similar theoretical features and are consequently explained by the same constructs at the neighborhood level” (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999: 636). They label the antecedents “concentration of disadvantage and lowered collective efficacy” (ibid.: 636). Given the potential reciprocal relationship between incivilities and collective efficacy, it may be premature to conclude collective efficacy is an independent contributor to community crime rates. Nonetheless, the most important point is that “results such as these contradict the strong version of the broken windows thesis” (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999: 636).

The cross-sectional, ecological impacts of incivilities on responses to crime, such as fear, are still not fully understood, but collective efficacy does appear to be involved in these connections. Neighborhood-level analyses of several dozen Baltimore neighborhoods showed a bivalent impact of incivilities. Assessed incivilities directly elevated fear and behavioral restriction, while at the same time they depressed fear and restriction because they stimulated local involvement and attachment (Taylor 1996). At this juncture we cannot say with confidence that, at the ecological level, incivilities connect cross-sectionally with higher fear, as anticipated by the model; we do not yet have an analysis from one city, or from several cities, that looks at this connection while simultaneously considering not only structure, but also social networks, social climate, and collective efficacy.

When we turn to longitudinal work, we have only one neighborhood-level study with significant time elapsed between initial and follow-up measures (Taylor 2001). Work with several dozen neighborhoods in Baltimore showed that initial incivilities demonstrated some predicted lagged effects on crime, fear, and one pathway of neighborhood decline. Nonetheless, these impacts were not well patterned across multiple outcomes, depended on the type of incivility indicator used, and paled in comparison to the structural impacts of initial racial and status
Incivilities reduction policing composition. Another longitudinal study at the streetblock level, using a shorter change time frame of one year, also finds weaker than expected lagged incivilities effects on responses to crime (Robinson, Lawton, Taylor, and Perkins 2003). In short, initial incivilities are not strongly and consistently determinative of later neighborhood crime or structure, or of later shifts in residents’ responses to crime.

Such murky empirical outcomes naturally lead us back to questions about whether incivility reduction as a policing strategy will have a long-term payoff. It may be that “crime fighting” is far more important than “grime fighting” for improving future neighborhood quality (Taylor 2001: 372).

One final comment deserves mention before leaving questions of the causal impact of neighborhood incivilities. Some have recently suggested we should not worry whether order maintenance policing, based on the incivilities thesis, does or does not have the long-term causal impacts it is presumed to have (Thacher 2004). According to this view, the policing activities themselves are inherently worthwhile; they have “intrinsic merit” (412) as policy tools and deserve closer examination irrespective of potential impacts.

Such a proposal seems to ignore questions of policy selection. There are many different forms locale-based policing can take. Order maintenance policing is just one of those. It would seem more useful to find the police strategies that are the most effective for the long-term outcomes envisioned, and use those impact assessments to guide strategy selection, rather than to invest energy in describing strategies that may be less than optimal.

Empirical evidence speaks not only to questions of hypothesized impacts, but also to presumed measurement structures. If incivilities indeed reflect underlying conditions of disorder, different indicators, from different methods, should correlate strongly with one another. They don’t always (Taylor 1999; Taylor 2001: 117–121), especially when we examine change rather than cross-sectional indicators. It is not unusual for neighborhoods changing in one direction on perceived incivilities to be changing in the opposite direction on assessed deterioration.

To expand on this last point, longitudinal versions of the incivilities thesis fail to describe the temporal sequence of described processes. How long does it take for increased social or physical incivilities to “inspire” additional serious crime? We currently have in place both the microecological principles (Taylor 1997), and the statistical procedures (Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, and Yang 2004) for understanding how different types of streetblocks change in different ways over time. We need a series of studies, with continuous longitudinal data available for
independent, mediating, and outcome variables, to help us further specify the temporal component of the theory.

Evaluating police work

Considerable debate has ensued about the impacts of New York’s broken windows policing implemented under Commissioner Bratton, and the extent to which it was responsible for dramatic crime reductions in the 1990s (Bratton 1998; Silverman 1999; Blumstein and Wallman 2000). Those arguments are too complex to summarize here. One piece of work cited in favor of the police strategies, however, uses New York City precinct and borough-level data to examine changes in crime over time, and links those changes to increased misdemeanor arrests by police (Kelling and Sousa 2001). Unfortunately, the statistical analysis in that work has numerous limitations. Further, at that time in New York City the police were doing many things. In addition to broken windows policing they were implementing the Compstat process for organizational review and management of ongoing crime and reduction efforts. It is simply not possible to separate out the impacts of these different program components.

To resolve physical problems in a neighborhood related to housing or street conditions, police need to work alongside other agencies or key local actors like landlords or small business managers. Although often referred to as third-party policing rather than broken windows policing, the focus is often on physical or social incivilities, and lower crime and/or lower drug sales are an expected outcome. Several studies suggest these strategies work, although perhaps not as effectively as hoped (Green 1996; Mazerolle, Kadleck, and Roehl 1998). With such strategies, moreover, because they are usually multi-agency, working with housing inspectors and courts, it is often not clear what the contributions are of the police themselves.

Theoretical concerns

Space limitations preclude more than a brief summary of the major theoretical concerns raised by the incivilities thesis, and of the programs put into place based in part on its tenets (for more detail see Taylor 2001: 95–122; Harcourt 2001: 123–216). Some of the major points of this discussion are as follows.

What disorder where? As Wilson and Kelling (1982) originally anticipated, it is difficult to define one type of disorder deserving police attention in all locations. The focus of order maintenance policing efforts
Incivilities reduction policing always will be context-sensitive. Presumably the focus that does emerge will be driven in large part by the officers’ communications with citizen and business leaders in the community. Discretion always has been key to police conduct (Kelling 1999). To say police will focus on different non-crime problems in one location vs. another represents nothing new. It does, however, create challenges for police supervisors, and it does place a premium on police being closely enough connected with local citizen and business leaders so they have a sense of what is most disturbing to the community.

**Collapse of the harm principle.** Harcourt (2001) suggests that elevating minor misdemeanors to arrest-worthy behaviors, making the merely annoying dangerous because of its anticipated long-term harmful impacts on the community, results in a collapse of the harm principle. Stated differently, previously accepted orderings differentiating more vs. less serious criminal or deviant behavior get collapsed, creating confusion rather than changing normative views toward minor misdemeanors. A May 11, 2001 Associated Press story reported a fifth grader handcuffed and taken from Oldsmar Elementary School in Florida for drawing pictures of guns.

**Increasing inequality.** In addition, we know that those offenses where officers have the most discretion are often policed in a racially biased manner. Arrest patterns for minor misdemeanors are likely to introduce even greater levels of racial inequality into criminal justice processing (Tonry 1995). Increasing police activity around misdemeanors seems likely to increase overall racial inequality in this “front end” portion of criminal justice processing.

**Subject creation.** Focusing policing efforts on disorderly people widens the social gap between the haves and the have-nots, making the latter even less deserving, more criminal, and more dangerous than they are. It creates an “uncritical dichotomy between disorderly people and law abiders” (Harcourt 2001: 7). Such a binary schema is not only inaccurate, but also encourages further social divisiveness.

**Where does broken windows policing come from?**

George Kelling and others have placed the development of broken windows policing in a specific historical context (Kelling and Coles 1996; Kelling 1999). That perspective sees police in the 1970s and 1980s as hamstrung, unable to take care of the minor infractions they saw because of concerns about citizen complaints and lack of court follow-through. I propose here an alternate view, one that starts with the urban disorders of the 1960s, and the various types of policing innovations that followed.
as a subsequent reform response. This amounts to further expanding the above descriptive context by placing the theoretical evolution of the broken windows thesis in a broader set of evolving police–citizen coproduction strategies. If my *mis en scène* is correct, then for broken windows policing to work we must first attend to the essentials of the coproduction process, and, second, understand the special longitudinal challenges to that process posed by the urban residential fabric.

Although it is ancient history to anyone less than 50 in 2000, urban disorders rocked dozens of major US cities in the 1960s. Looting and citizen riots in many cities, and police riots in some cities were later put under the analytical microscope by high-profile commissions or sociologists (Fogelson 1968). One of the most widely quoted reports from the time by the Kerner Commission concluded that policing practices had contributed in part to some of the outbreaks (Kerner 1968).

Consequent concerns about police practices inspired not only federal initiatives seeking to further professionalize the police; they also encouraged widespread thinking about ways in which police department structures and practices could reduce the distrust and antagonism between police officers and citizens, especially citizens of lower-income urban communities of color.

Structural changes emerging from such thinking included the rise of police-organized community relations councils, often staffed by a community relations sergeant; additional police–citizen review commissions with some oversight over some range of police matters; and, later, citizen police academies. Whether these changes were just “window dressing” or more substantive, and why the degree of citizen review or oversight varied across locales are interesting questions, but not ones to be pursued given the focus here.

More relevant to the focus are a host of strategies first appearing in the very early 1970s. These can be grouped roughly into two classes – those emphasizing citizens’ and citizen groups’ roles, and those emphasizing how patrolling police interact with citizens. Strategies emphasizing citizens’ roles included a broad range of community crime prevention activities: Neighborhood Watch, Citizens on Patrol, Operation ID, security surveys, and Operation Whistlestop, to name a few (Rosenbaum 1988). Although the origins of some of these go back to Winchester, England and the 1200s, the key feature as these emerged in the 1970s was a neighborhood-based coordinating group working with a designated police officer. The latter was often a crime prevention specialist or a community relations officer. Much has been written about whether these
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programs were successful or not, for what crimes, under what types of conditions (Rosenbaum 1986; 1987; 1988).

A second class of strategies also emerging in the early and mid-1970s addressed patrolling officers’ relations with citizenry more generally. Many departments sought to develop more “stable” relationships between patrolling officers, local citizens, and local small business personnel. Patrolling officers were assigned to particular neighborhoods for an extended period of time with team policing and geographic- or neighborhood-based policing. The hope was that over time officers would develop an understanding of how local residents and business leaders viewed crime and related problems in those locations (Greene and Pelfrey 1997). To deepen this understanding, in the late 1970s researchers like Robert Trojanowicz suggested flattening the tires on the patrol cars, giving the police Nikes, and getting them out of their cars. Foot patrolling officers also were tasked to work cooperatively with local business and citizen leaders and identify the specific crimes, crime locations, and crime-related problems deserving attention. Police–citizen contact, coordination, and coproduction were seen as critical conditions for success (Greene and Taylor 1988). This model, in contrast to the typical community crime prevention model, links numerous police officers simultaneously with numerous local citizens and local business personnel without an intervening neighborhood organization.

Progressing into the 1980s and 1990s, these models morphed into related labels including third-party policing (Mazerolle, Kadleck, and Roehl 1997; Buerger and Mazerolle 1998), problem-oriented policing (Spelman and Eck 1987; Eck and Spelman 1989; Goldstein 1990; Mazerolle, Ready, Terrill, and Waring 2000), and, most difficult to define, community policing (Cordner 1997). Despite widespread disagreement about what constitutes community policing, and what its goals are (Greene and Mastrofski 1988), most would agree on the following underlying principles (Skogan and Hartnett 1997): “organizational decentralization” (6) permitting more autonomy to those officers most directly involved with the locals, and easier police–public communication; “a commitment to . . . problem-oriented policing” (7); “responsiveness to citizen input” (8); and building neighborhood capacity to prevent crime or solve crime-related problems, i.e., to help neighborhood groups become coproducers of safety (8).

Within this broader evolution, the development of both the practice and theory behind incivilities reduction policing proves intriguing as well. On the practice side, the initial policing focus was a variant of problem-oriented policing (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Following a problem-oriented SARA approach (Scanning, Analysis, Response and
Assessment) (Spelman and Eck 1987), police would identify troublesome conditions in a locale, and work with citizenry and other agencies to resolve those. Oakland’s “Beat Health” program was an excellent example of such an approach (Mazerolle, Kadlec, and Roehl 1998). In short, broken windows policing clearly started out as a coproduction model. Citizens were involved in problem identification, and other agencies were involved in problem resolution. It was not presumed the police would board up the abandoned houses themselves. To better understand this coproduction component, the following section outlines its essential elements.

**Coproduction**

Police rely on citizens and other agencies in numerous ways. Most simply, citizens must report incidents to the police if the police are not right there to see the crime taking place. So fundamentally, producing public safety is a coproduction process, wherein police and citizens, and other organizations working with the police all contribute to the outcome (Ostrom, Parks, Whitaker, and Percy 1979). Ostrom (1996: 1073) defines coproduction as: “the process through which inputs used to provide a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization.” Further: “Coproduction implies that citizens can play an active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them” (Ostrom 1996: 1073).

Various factors make coproduction more or less effective than a service provision model for achieving the intended outcome. Service recipients – in this case neighborhood residents, neighborhood leaders, and local business personnel – need to be active participants in the process (Ostrom 1996: 1079). In addition “both parties must be legally entitled to take decisions, giving them both some room for manoeuvre . . . [and] participants need to build credible commitments to one another (e.g., through contractual obligations, based on trust or by enhancing social capital)” (Jeffery and Vira 2001: 9).

Reputations, trust, and reciprocity play pivotal roles in increasing cooperation between members of the partnership (Ostrom 1998). A coproducive relationship between citizen leaders and police may create policing which is more responsive and more favorably viewed, and a citizenry more willing to report to the police (Ostrom and Whitaker 1973).

Clearly, significant structural impediments beyond the control of police departments limit the possibilities of effective police–citizen coproduction. Most importantly, police, in contrast to other public sector
Incivilities reduction policing agencies, are charged with maintaining social control, and administering “law” (Black 1980). Reciprocity cannot emerge given such a condition, although mutual responsiveness can. In addition, the citizenry in locations where effective coproduction is most needed – low income, urban communities of color – are exactly the same places where distrust between the police and citizens is most profound (Weitzer 1999; Weitzer and Tuch 1999). The trust requisite for maximally effective coproduction will take much longer to grow in these locations.

The above limitations aside, in key ways police innovations emerging since the 1970s contained elements of a coproduction model. They attempted to increase citizen–police trust, to facilitate stable relationships between police and local leaders and citizens, and, by tuning police to local concerns, increase locality-based police responsiveness.

Zero tolerance policing, and back where we started

Unfortunately, some current police practices relying on the incivilities thesis as justification have moved completely away from a coproduction idea. The popular zero tolerance policing is a case in point. When police focus just on that subset of social incivilities – disorderly or drunk people, rowdy groups of teens, panhandlers or street vagrants – and seek to remove them from the street, either through aggressive policing, or fines, or even arrests, we have zero tolerance policing.

These behaviors are aggressively targeted by police in the belief that suppressing these street activities will reduce the occurrence in those places of more serious crimes. The primary focus is on social incivilities, with less attention given to physical conditions. For example, in his first year on the job Baltimore City Police Commissioner Kevin P. Clark increased misdemeanor citations about 500 percent (Davis 2004).

The movement toward zero tolerance strategies and away from coproduction has taken place gradually over the last twenty years (McArdle and Erzin 2001). This changing emphasis within the incivilities thesis may be driven in part by wider societal changes (Garland 2002; Ismaili 2003: 262). Putting the policing shifts in a broader context, we may be seeing a historic shift in American and Canadian policing back to the social control model of the late nineteenth century, and away from the crime control model which dominated in the second quarter of the twentieth century (Monkkonen 1981; Boritch and Hagan 1987).

Kelling (1999: 3) has recognized that incivilities models are used to support zero tolerance strategies, but he argues against such a connection: “it is an equation that I have never made.”
Nevertheless, zero tolerance policing policies are widely accepted because they are legitimated, in the minds of many, by the incivilities thesis. Over time the police and the public expect these strategies to reduce serious crime rates. Police themselves believe this (see Kelling and Sousa 2001, ethnographic observation 2A).

There is some irony here. Post-urban disorder policing innovations spanning at least three decades have sought to defuse police–community antagonisms by moving closer to coproduction models. Scrutiny of police–community relations following the disorders of the 1960s led to a variety of coproduction models. With community crime prevention initiatives, police were to coordinate with citizenry through local citizen-led groups, and the members of those groups would serve as the “eyes and ears” of the police. In return, the police would keep those groups informed about local crime patterns. Geographic and team policing were department-based organizational strategies intended to increase trust of the police among local citizens, citizen leaders, and business personnel. In the mid-1980s departments sought closer connections with communities through community policing partnerships; they also sought to increase their effectiveness through third-party policing and problem-oriented policing initiatives. These latter innovations required police to coordinate much more closely than they had in the past with other local agencies. Such coordination was in recognition of the limits of police powers, coupled with the hope that solving problems related to crime could make residents feel better and might even reduce crime itself.

The perceived importance of problems related to crime such, as social or physical incivilities, has increased steadily through the last two if not three decades, and this shift links to broader trends (Garland 2002). Although many of these incivilities require the police to coordinate with other agencies such as housing or licencing and inspections, there is a subset of social incivilities against which the police can act directly: people being disorderly.

Thus, this series of innovations has come full circle. Zero tolerance policies, ostensibly in the minds of some justified by the incivilities thesis, endorse and entrench the aggressive policing thought originally to contribute to the disorders in the first place. Despite the ongoing debate about the sources – from the individual police department up to the changing social fabric – inspiring this evolution; despite scholars’ refutation of the incivilities thesis/zero tolerance connection; and despite the empirical weaknesses and theoretical vagaries of the incivilities thesis, zero tolerance policing is currently popular and thought to be justified by that thesis.
Returning policing innovations to a coproduction model

What is needed at this juncture is to return policing innovations more generally to a coproduction model. What are the impediments to such a reintegration?

Major challenges to effective police–community coproduction over time emerge from the longitudinal texture of the urban residential fabric. These stumbling blocks, and the empirical evidence pointing them out, are described in more detail elsewhere (Taylor 2001: 303–357). In brief, the main points are these. Using qualitative interviews with over sixty Baltimore neighborhood leaders in the mid-1990s, and examining changes in official neighborhood boundaries sanctioned by the local planning department between 1979 and 1995, we gauged the types of changes in neighborhood names and boundaries taking place, and how those created challenges for coproduction. For a range of sociological reasons, neighborhood boundaries and names can change over time (Hunter 1971; 1974). We found that both type and extent of change were often linked to local racial differences, socioeconomic status, or political agendas from beyond the neighborhood itself (Logan and Molotch 1987). We suggested that those changes create substantial difficulties for police–citizen coproduction of public safety.

We saw that neighborhoods where stable police partnerships were most needed were those where significant changes were most likely to occur over a short time in both boundaries and representing organizations. In such locales police working with community leaders were in danger of collaborating with decreasingly representative community groups, or of being confused about the relevant spatial domain, or both.

Ideally, community–police partnerships should be organized at the neighborhood level. To do so would increase citizens’ buy-in and stake in the outcome. Partnerships organized around police beats or districts (e.g., Skogan and Hartnett 1997) end up working with a cluster of local leaders in each beat, whose constituencies only partially overlap the police organizing unit. In these situations it is not surprising that local leaders’ commitments often rapidly wane.

If police are to move to a neighborhood-based framework for organizing partnerships, some sort of stability of neighborhood would seem to be required. Ongoing neighborhood changes decrease police willingness to move to that organizing framework, and create difficulties in establishing working relationships between police and citizens. If police are to engage in problem reduction, and to be effective and respond in ways that best benefit the overall community, they need to understand a single spatial arena and the key players. It takes time working in one locale with one set
of stakeholders to develop such understanding. Understanding, trust, and some element of reciprocity are key ingredients for effective coproduction (Ostrom 1998).

Given the volume and diversity of neighborhood boundary and name changes observed, and the understandable urban dynamics driving these changes (Hunter 1974) it appears that successful police-community coproducing relationships could be developed only in urban or suburban locations with strong overarching neighborhood governance structures. Many cities have such structures (Hallman 1984; Ferman 1996). To attempt to stabilize such partnerships without that broader, organizing and legitimizing political structure, effectively dooms these partnerships. It limits them to being no more than anemic relationships with no real commitment either from police or from citizen leaders. According to the coproduction model, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to coproduce community safety in such settings without that broader infrastructure.

Summary

The incivilities thesis and police work focusing on incivility reduction emerged from a preceding tradition of policing innovations, starting in the early 1970s, in response to urban riots of the 1960s. This emerging tradition sought to create successful police–community partnerships. The incivilities thesis has evolved, moving from initial psychological, cross-sectional formulations to ecological and longitudinal formulations. Empirical support documenting impacts of incivilities over time on crime, responses to crime, and neighborhood change, has been weaker and less consistent than hoped. Empirical investigations documenting salutary impacts of disorder reduction police work remain few and their rigor contested. Solid evidence of successful incivilities reduction nested within third-party policing has emerged, but the specific contribution of police work itself is not clear. A currently widely practiced version of disorder reduction policing is zero tolerance policing. It is thought by many to be justified by the incivilities thesis despite the latter’s originator denying this connection, and despite the weak support for the thesis. Zero tolerance repudiates the police–community coproduction model on which the incivilities thesis, and earlier police–community innovations, were grounded. It is exacerbating the very problems these earlier policing innovations sought to reduce. To move back to a coproduction model of policing we will need to solve the problem of changing neighborhood identities, organizations, and boundaries.
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NOTES

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2. More specifically: the analysis confounds boroughs and precincts in one level of analysis rather than separating them out; there are no controls for spatial autocorrelation effects; and controls for basic ecological fabric appear to be underspecified, with no variables for racial composition or stability.

3. Of course, this is not the only decade of the twentieth century in which police activity has been linked to urban riots.

REFERENCES


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